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Abstract:  We  consider  three  broad  types  of  employment  contract  vis,  self-employment, PRP,  and  fixed  wage 
employment. We focus on  the implied degree  of  income  risk  associated  with each  type of  employment  contract, 
arguing that such risk falls as we move from self-employment at one extreme to fixed wage employment at the other. 
We investigate the possibility that there is a systematic relationship between employment within a particular contract 
type and risk preference as proxied by expenditure on risky goods and goods associated with risk averse behaviour. A 
typical question might be:  'do self-employed individuals attempt to compensate for the relatively high level of income 
risk they face by reducing their expenditure on relatively risky goods? Or, do such individuals have a taste for risk 
which they express in both their working and non-working life?'  Our empirical analysis, based on pooled cross-section 
data drawn from the British  Family Expenditure  Survey 1997-2000, provides evidence of  a systematic relationship 
between employment contract type and risk preference, with, for example, self-employed workers being more (less) 
likely  to  engage  in  the  consumption of  "risky"  (financial  security)  products.  The results  are based  the  Ordered 
Generalized Extreme Values model  (OGEV), a relatively infrequently used discrete choice model, which importantly 
allows for ordering and correlation in the observed alternatives. 
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April 2002 I.  Introduction 
The nature  of  the employment contract  has  long intrigued economists. Particular emphasis has 
recently focused upon the implications of fixed wage contracts, self-employment and performance 
related pay (PRP). The efficiency wage hypothesis, for example, has examined the notion that the 
firm's production costs might be inversely related to the level of pay and, in so doing, has proffered . 
an explanation for equilibrium unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). On the other hand, the 
" 
analysis  of  self-employment  has  concentrated  on  its  potential  as  a  means  of  alleviating 
unemployment  (Taylor,  1996). Perhaps most controversial, however, has been  the academic and 
popular interest in PRP. Re-kindled by Weitzman's (1985) purported macroeconomic benefits of 
profit  sharing, attention  has  turned towards  the more readily discernible, and originally lauded, 
microeconomic benefits of PRP schemes broadly defined (Blinder, 1990).' 
In this paper we investigate the degree of  'income risk'  associated with these three broad 
types of employment contract. Fixed wage employment, for example, implies relatively stable pay.2 
In contrast, a self-employed  worker can offer increasingly competitive tenders as the demand for 
hisher labour  services declines, thereby maintaining a vestige of  employment, albeit at or near 
hisher reservation wage. For such individuals price is fluid. PRP contracts, comprising an element 
of both fixed and variable pay, provide a mid point between these two extremes. In what follows, 
we focus primarily on income risk and so presume that self-employment is relatively more risky 
than PRP, whch is itself relatively more risky than fixed wage employment. 
If individuals were identical in terms of  their attitudes towards risk, and in the absence of 
ability  andlor  capital  constraints,  one  would  anticipate a pooling equilibrium with  all  workers 
floclng to  one  of  the  three  contacts.  More  realistically,  a  spectrum of  risk  aversion  and  the 
presence  of  such  constraints would imply a separating equilibrium, with the expected utility of 
-- 
'  We define PRP as those contracts in which an element of total compensation is based on employee performance. This 
includes both formal (e.g.  employee share ownership, profit sharing) and informal schemes (e.g. discretionary bonus). 
However, the inability of prices to absorb a productivity or demand shock may result in layoffs. employment across each of  the three contracts types being equalised. An  interesting line of  enquiry 
is therefore  to  ascertain the attitudes towards risk of  individuals employed within each contract 
type. Our hypothesis is that there is a systematic relationship between risk preferencefaversion and 
the observed employment contract. We make no presumption as to the direction of  this relationship. 
A taste for risk may be expressed in terms of both consumption and employment; for example, risk 
lovers may be both  self-employed and spend more time (and money) on  risky activities such as 
gambling.  Alternatively, individuals may be  more  inclined to gamble if  they  have  access to a 
relatively  stable income  stream; or because they  are self-employed they  may  be  relatively less 
inclined  to  gamble.3 We  have  no  prior  as  regards  the  complementarity or  substitutability of 
employment contract types and consumption risk. Our aim is simply to ascertain whether there is a 
systematic relationship across the three contracts types. 
The novelty  of  our  approach is threefold. Firstly,  in  contrast to the  limited  amount of 
existing research in this area, which focuses solely on self-employment, we set our analysis within 
a wider  framework  by  focusing on  a range  of  employment contract types which  are  explored 
collectively  rather  than  in  isolation.  Secondly,  we  utilise  a  set  of  proxy  variables  such  as 
participation in gambling activities and types of  insurance held to capture attitudes towards risk. 
Our data which is drawn from the British Family Expenditure Surveys 1997 to 2000 is particularly 
appropriate for our purpose since it harbours the key facets required for this analysis, containing 
detailed information on employment contracts as well as individual and household characteristics. 
Finally, in our empirical analysis we focus on the Ordered Generalized Extreme Values (OGEV) 
model. Somewhat surprisingly this model is infrequently used in practice. It is appropriate for our 
analysis, as it retains the flexibility of the MNL whilst simultaneously allowing for ordering and 
correlation in the observed outcomes. 
Another  aspect  here  concerns the  compensating  wage  differentials  associated  with  each  contract  type.  If  self- 
employment is the most risky contract it may imply higher mean income which, if gambling is a normal good, will 
imply higher gambling expenditures ceteris paribus. Our modelling strategy is to present results obtained from an Ordered Probit model and also 
the OGEV model. We order employment contract types according to the implied degree of  'income 
risk'  associated with  each contract: fixed wage  employment; PRP;  self-employment. Given the 
general consensus that self-employment is inherently more risky than fixed wage employment, our 
ranking in terms of  income risk seems appropriate. The results, derived from analysis of the British 
Family Expenditure Suwey (FES) over the period 1997-2000, do suggest a systematic relationship 
between our risk preferencelaversion proxies and employment under a particular type of  contract. 
To be sure, our results suggest the existence of  a positive relationship between risk preferences and 
employment within a particular type of  contract. 
The paper is set out as follows: Section II discusses some background issues to our thesis; 
Section I11  outlines our data and methodology; Section lV  presents the results; and Section  V 
presents some final comments. 
11.  Economic Considerations 
Although the nature of  the employment contract has long intrigued economists, the relationship 
between  attitudes  towards  risk  and  the  nature  of  employment  contracts  has  essentially  been 
ignored. One explanation for this concerns the  difficulty of  measuring risk empirically. Several 
studies have relied  on  self-reported measures, In their analysis  of  medical  group practices, for 
example, Gaynor and Gertler (1995) analyse self-reported risk preference measures based on the 
level of  importance attached to the regularity of  income. Similarly, Shaw (1996), in  a study of 
human capital investment and the degree of  relative risk aversion, measures risk via  information 
pertaining to the allocation of  wealth to risky assets and survey information regarding individuals' 
attitudes towards financial risk. 
In terms of  our three broad classifications of  employment  contract, research has focused 
most clearly on the relationship between self-employment and risk, Recent years have heralded a 
resurgence  of  interest amongst both  academics and policy makers  in  the  determinants of  self- employment, and its role as a potential solution to unemployment and poverty.4 As a result of  (or 
perhaps, as an inspiration to) this interest, the self-employed have emerged as an important class of 
workers in many developed countries, accounting for sixteen per cent of the workforce in Australia, 
ten per cent in Canada, nine per cent in the ITK and nine per cent in the US in 1999 (Le, 1999). A 
number of  approaches have been developed to explain the supply and demand of self-employment, 
emphasising to varying degrees sociological, psychological, and economic factors (see Keeble et 
al., 1993, for a review). 
The  basic  economic  argument is  that  individuals  decide whether  or not  to enter  self- 
employment  on  the  basis  of  the  relative  utilities  on  offer.  Such  an  approach  encapsulates 
unemployment push  and  pull  factors, with displaced workers  being pushed  or pulled  into self- 
employment by supply side considerations. Relative returns, however, are but one part of the story. 
It has long been recognised that returns to self-employment are intrinsically risluer than the returns 
to  salaried employment. An  interesting issue is then  the  type of  individual attracted into  self- 
employment. 
Self-employment has long been  regarded as an  indicator  of  'entrepreneurship'  and as a 
conduit through which the demand for labour can be increased (Blanchflower and OswaId, 1998). 
Indeed, it has long been argued that the most important factor limiting the size of  a firm is the co- 
ordinating ability of  the entrepreneur leading the firm (Kalldor, 1934) and attitudes towards risk 
were identified as an important determinant of entrepreneurship by as early as Knight (1921). 
One of  the most influential contributions to this literature was the seminal paper by Lucas 
(1978).  The  thrust  of  Lucas'  model  is  the  observation  that  within  a  closed  economy,  a full 
employment equilibrium will involve some people becoming entrepreneurs and creating firms that 
will in turn employ others. The actual division between entrepreneurs and salaried labour depends 
4  A number of  government policies confirm this interest.  In Australia the  'New  Enterprise Incentive Scheme'  has 
provided training and income support to the unemployed that wish to enter self-employment. In the UK the government 
provides transfer payments to the unemployed when they  start their business, whilst in the US a number of schemes 
have emerged to encourage the growth of minority small business, see Le  (1999). crucially on  the  distribution  of  individuals'  characteristics  within  the  population, in  particular 
entrepreneurial talent that varies across individuals. The Lucas model was extended to explicitly 
include risk by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Kanbur (1979). Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) 
attempt to explain how individuals make the decision between a risky, but potential high rewarding 
entrepreneurial career, and a riskless wage: 
There are, of course, many factors that should influence this choice. The most important ones would 
include entrepreneurial ability, labour skills, attitudes towards risk, and initial access to the capital 
required  to  create a firm. The present  paper  focuses on  risk  aversion as the  determinant which 
explains who becomes an entrepreneur and who becomes a labourer (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979, 
p. 720). 
Kanbur  (1979) develops  a  model  of  occupational  choice  under  risk.  Individuals can  chose to 
become a wage-earning employee, supplying a single unit of  homogenous labour and receiving the 
riskless competitive wage; or alternatively, they can chose to become an entrepreneur, employing 
other workers and producing a homogenous output according to a production function that includes 
the individual's endowment of  entrepreneurial ability. Entrepreneurship is risky in the sense that 
individuals have no prior information  as regards their own particular level of  ability. In Kanbur's 
model individuals apply the common population distribution of aptitude whilst perceived expected 
ability remains constant across individuals. This approach is extended in  Van Praag and Cramer 
(2001) who allow individual expectations of entrepreneurial talent to depend upon specific personal 
characteristics. The  corresponding  talent  distribution,  but  not  the  outcome,  is  known  to  the 
individual. Thus an individual will choose entrepreneurship if  the expected rewards from so doing  . 
exceed that from the wages offered by employment. These expected rewards will depend on  the 
individual's assessment of  hisfher own ability and on his/her attitude towards risk. Entrepreneurial 
success is determined by actual ability and these factors will determine the distribution of  a given 
labour supply over entrepreneurs and employees. Strong empirical support for the model is found 
from Dutch survey data that suggests that both risk-taking and ability are important determinants of 
successful entrepreneurship. A number of  papers have been developed from those outlined above including Calvo and 
Wellisz (1980), Evans and Jovannvic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a, 1994b), Jovanovic (1994), 
and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998). Since the 1980s, however, an  alternative research program 
into self-employment and entrepreneurship has emerged which has tended to extend psychological 
studies focusing on factors such as 'achievement motivation7 and 'attitudes towards control'  (see 
Brockhaus, 1980 and the reviews by Wortman, 1987 and Brockhaus and Hortwitz, 1986) whilst the 
most  recent  research  has  focused  on  the  attributes  of  the  self-employed  rather  than  on  their 
propensity  to take risk  (see, for example, Georgellis  and Wall, 2000, Le,  1999 and Clarke and 
Drinkwater, 2000).~ 
Our focus in this paper is the relationship between an individual's  'taste'  for risk and the 
type of employment contract in which he/she is observed. The novelty of our approach lies in the 
range of  employment contracts considered, the use of  a number of  proxy  variables  to  capture 
attitudes towards risk and the estimation techniques employed. In terms of the former we envisage 
a spectrum of  contracts which may be nested in the illustrative form:  w,  = (1 -4)  ij  +  Aj  f  (e;  8)  ; 
where  j=fi,prp,se  (denoting  'fixed  wage',  'PRP7 and  'self-employment',  respectively);  wj 
denotes total remuneration; iT  the component of total remuneration that is independent of worker 
performance; f (e;  0) some function mapping the relationship between worker performance 8 and 
a  stochastic  parameter e  and; 4 the  proportion  of  total  remuneration  that  is dependent  upon 
- 
performance.  We  presume  that  a,  =0,  AP  E (01 and  As  =  1  such  that  w,  = w  , 
W~rp  = (1 -  APT  )iT +A,,  f  (e:  0)  , and  w,  = f (e;  8)  . Assume  for  simplicity that  8 can  take  two 
values,  8=  (8,,0,),  with  f (e;B,)  > f (e;8,),  the range  of  income to which  an  individual  is 
5 One exception is Parker (1996) who analyses the role of risk in the self-employment decision. 
7 exposed  is  defined  by  Aw  =  A, [  f (eyeH)  -  f (eyeL)]  with  the  implication that  income risk  is 
increasing in  A,. 6 
Since risk preferences are unobservable we follow Hersch and Pickton (1995), Hersch and 
Viscusi  (1990) and Barsky  et a1  (1997) in  using proxies  to capture individual risk preference. 
Hersch and Viscusi (1990) and Hersch  and Pickton (1995) proxy risk preference by individuals' 
cigarette smoking and seat belt use. These studies explore how differences in individuals' attitudes 
w 
towards risk affect wage-risk  trade-offs. The revealed risk attitudes have an  important effect on 
observed risk premiums with non-smokers receiving a greater wage-risk trade-off than smokers. 
Barsky et 01.  (1997) adopt an experimental approach in order to elicit individual preference 
parameters. Participants were asked to respond to situations designed to yield information about 
their risk aversion such as their willingness to gamble lifetime income. Their findings suggest that 
risk tolerance is positively  and significantly related to risky behavior such as smoking, drinking, 
failing to have insurance and moreover the decision to be self-employed. They find a U-shaped 
relationship between years of schooling and risk tolerance. The youngest and the oldest individuals 
are found to be more risk tolerant, whilst males are found to be more risk tolerant than females and 
white respondents are found to be the least risk tolerant. Finally, the self-employed are found to 
have  a  higher  risk  tolerance  and  have  a  much  lower  average  propensity to  be  insured than 
employees. 
Our intention is to analyse the differences in the consumption of  various goods associated 
with risk, across employment contract types. In addition to exploring such consumption, we explore 
how factors such as education, age, gender, presence of dependent children and marital status affect 
employment contract type. Such issues have been explored in the theoretical literature on attitudes 
towards risk. Robson (1996), for example, explores the possibility that males are less risk averse 
than females from a theoretical perspective. Shaw (1996) suggests that more educated individuals 
The  presumption here  is,  of  course,  that  employment  is  secure. As  discussed previously,  the  inability  of  an 
8 are more likely to be risk-takers and that education and occupational status are related -  thus one 
might predict that participation in consumption on activities which reveal attitudes towards risk and 
household characteristics that affect individuals preference for risk will be related to contract type. 
111.  Data and Methodology 
Data 
.  Our data is drawn from the Family Expenditure  Suwey (FES) for the UK,  which  is a nationally 
representative survey  that  has  been  conducted  on  an  annual  basis  since  1957.  Some  10000 
households  are  selected  each  year  to  take  part  in  the  FES,  and  the  average  response rate  is 
approximately 70%. The main aim of  the survey is to provide a reliable source of  information on 
household expenditure, income and other aspects of  household finances. To account for seasonal 
differences in expenditure, face-to-face interviews are spread evenly over the year. Each individual 
aged 16 or over in  the households visited is asked to keep diary records of  daily expenditure for 
two  weeks.  Respondents  are  also  asked  to  complete  an  income  questionnaire. This  data  is 
especially appropriate for our purposes since it harbours the key facets required for our analysis. It 
contains detailed  information  on  employment contracts,  individual  specific characteristics and 
household specific characteristics. 
We use data from the 1997-1998, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 surveys. Prior to this period 
the dataset had a slightly different structure and some of  the variables required for our analysis are 
w  not available. Our sub-sample comprises worlung adults aged between  18 and 65 who are either 
self-employed or employed under  a fixed wage contract or a contract characterised by  a bonus 
scheme thereby introducing an element of PRP.~  The bonus schemes include: Christmas bonuses, 
productivity bonuses, profit  related  bonuses, loyalty bonuses,  dividends, incentive schemes and 
performance/sales bonuses. Clearly the nature of  these bonuses is somewhat diverse and as  such 
excessively rigid wage to absorb a productivity or demand shock may result in widespread layoffs. 
9 may  create different incentive mechanisms in  the workplace.  Sample statistics are set out in 
Tables 1-3. 
Self--Employed  PRP  Fixed Wage  Tota  1 
1287  9.41%  3623  26.49%  8765  64.10%  13675  100.0% 
J 
It is apparent from Table 1 that fixed wage contracts are the dominant form of employment 
contract  and  self-employment is  the  least  common  contract  type.  Table  2  shows  there  are  . 
interesting  differences  in  the  incidence  of  employment  contract  type  given  individual 
characteristics.  For  example,  men  are  relatively  more  likely  to  hold  employment  contracts 
associated with income risk. The incidence of  self-employment is higher amongst married relative 
to single, separated, divorced and widowed, respondents. This may reflect a form of  risk pooling 
with married people being attracted to self-employment because they can offset some income risk 
with other household members (for a full discussion of these issues see Brown et al, 2001). With 
respect  to  ethnicity, PRP  contracts are  more  heavily  concentrated  among  whites.  Whilst  the 
incidence of self-employment is low amongst blacks, the incidence of self-employment is relatively 
high among Asians and the 'other'  ethnic origin group (which is dominated by the Chinese), tying 
in with the findings of Borooah and Hart (1999). 
One might also hypothesise that both the number and the age of  any children will affect a 
parent's  willingness to take on  income risk. We therefore look at the number of  pre-school and 
school-age children in  the  household  and  find that  whilst the  former are distributed relatively 
evenly across employment contracts, the latter are highest  amongst self-employed workers. This 
may reflect the fact that self-employed workers are on average older than workers on PRP or fixed 
wage contracts. 
'  A small number of  individuals with more than one job, individuals employed by  the armed forces and agricultural 
















17 <Age< 19 
20 < Age < 29 
30 < Age < 39 
40 < Age < 49 
Age > 50 
Education level 










Professional  12.36  29.33  58.30 
Managerial & technical  6.99  29.78  68.23 
Skilled  11.35  24.14  64.5 1 
Partly skilled  7.32  24.33  68.35 
Unskilled  12.78  18.85  68.37 
Note: Numbers are expressed as a percentage of  rhe  rota1 number of individuals across the three 
contract types for  each individual  characteristic except those denoted by  * which represent  the 
average for each contract type. 
The age profile of people employed on PRP contracts is a-shaped. This may be due to that 
fact that such contracts have been more widely introduced over the last decade and, as such, may be 
reflecting a cohort rather than an age effect. The age profile of  people on fixed wage contracts is 
skewed towards the youngest age group (i.e. those less than twenty), suggesting that the income 
uncertainty  associated  with  PRP  contracts and  self-employment  may  be  prohibitively  high  for 
individuals with little labour market experience. In addition, they are less likely to have acquired the necessary capital to start a business. The proportion of individuals in self-employment increases 
with age, a finding that is consistent with the hypothesis that older, displaced workers might turn to 
self-employment given their relatively low probability of  re-employment. It might also reflect the 
ability of  older workers to acquire the necessary start-up capital for, and to better absorb the income 
uncertainty associated with, self-employment, on account of their longer accumulation of wealth.' 
d 
Individuals in self-employment have relatively few formal qualifications. PRP contracts, on 
the  other hand,  are concentrated amongst people  with  formal  school qualifications  and  above,  I 
whilst individuals holding fixed wage contracts  are relatively evenly spread across all levels of 
schooling. It would appear that whilst educational attainment plays an important role in explaining 
the probability of  holding PRP contacts or being  self-employed, it may not be so important in 
explaining why individuals hold fixed wage  contract^.^ 
In  relation to housing tenure, fixed wage employees are most likely to be found living in 
local authority housing, whilst the self-employed are more likely to own their homes outright and 
PRP workers, are most likely live in  homes that are mortgaged. This may reflect the fact that 
housing equity is often used as collateral to secure loans necessary to start up a small business. 
With respect to the occupational class variables, we find that the incidence of  fixed wage 
employment  increases  as  the  level  of  skill  associated  with  the  job  falls,  being  particularly 
concentrated in the partly skilled and unskilled categories. PRP contracts are most common among 
professionals  and  managers  whilst  the  incidence  of  self-employment  is  high  for professional, 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
The focus of our analysis is the link between an individual's observed employment contract  . 
type and their taste for risk. Whilst an individual's preference for, or aversion to, risk is not directly 
observable, our data provides a number of  variables that  might be  considered reasonable proxy 
8  See Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (1998) for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  importance of  capital  constraints for  the 
rrobabtlity of becoming self-employed. 
This is a further justification  of  the OGEV model versus the Ordered Probit one (see below) as the former allows 
coefficients and significance levels to vary across alternatives. measures. It may be the case that risk-preferring individuals are more likely to consume  'risky' 
goods such as alcohol, cigarettes and 'gambling7,  'O  whilst risk averse individuals are more likely to 
concentrate resources on  financial security through investments yielding unearned income and to 
purchase insurance products. 
Self-Employed  PRP  Fixed Wage 





Mean Unearned income  (£pw)  and % of Individuals who receive unearned income 
Unearned income  27.25  66.90  14.76  72.62  15.42  63.75 
Table  3  sets  out, by  employment  contract  type,  the  mean  levels of  expenditures  on  a 
selection of  goods that are thought to reveal  information about risk preference/aversion  and the 
mean level of  unearned income received (given that unearned income may act as a buffer against 
employment income risk). It is apparent that the proportion of  individuals holding home contents 
insurance is largest (smallest) for the self-employed (fixed wage workers) and expenditure on life 
insurance exhibits the same pattern. This is true for the level of  expenditure and the percentage of 
individuals within the contract types who participate in these expenditures. Alcohol expenditure is 
highest, in  value and the level of  participation,  for PRP workers, whilst cigarette expenditure is 
largest for self-employed workers.  Table 3 also reports the mean levels of  unearned income and 
shows that  the  self-employed have  the  highest  levels  of  unearned  income  whilst  the  highest 
proportion of  workers within a contract group receiving unearned income are the PRP workers. 
'O  Gambling expenditure comprises expenditure on football pools, bingo, bookmakers and the national lottery, which 
represent the key components of gambling expenditure within the UK. Methodology 
Our  econometric  methodology  is  based  on  pooled  cross-section  econometric  analysis  of  the 
relationship between  contract type, individual, household and job-specific  characteristics, and an 
extensive set of  variables associated with risk preference/aversion. The focus is on discrete choice 
methods, as the dependent variable is categorical in nature, talung the value of  1 if the individual is 
.1 
employed on a fixed wage contract, 2 if he/she is employed on a PRP contract and 3 if he/she is 
self-employed.  8 
As  is  common  in  the  literature  (see,  for example, Fry  et al.,  1993), the random utility 
maximization  (RUM) model provides a convenient starting point, with an  indirect utility function 
given by: 
uq  =  yj  +  E, =  x;P, +  €,,  (1) 
with  i = 1,. .  .  ,  N  and  j =  1,. .  .  ,  J . U, is the utility individual i obtains from alternative j,  which is 
assumed  to be  a  linear  (in  parameters)  function  of  their  (kxl) vector  of  observed personal 
heterogeneity,  x,,  with  unknown  weights  Pj (that is, the  weights  are  allowed to  vary  across 
alternatives).  E~ is a random disturbance term. 
The utilities of equation (I) are not directly observed, what is observed is the realisation of 
this latent variable, with  Y,  = j if the ith  individual is employed under an employment contract of 
type j. It is assumed that the individual is characterised by that alternative which maximizes hisher 
utility from the full set of  alternatives C,  C =  (1,. .  .  ,  J}  . 
C 
Under  the  usual  assumption  that  E,  follows  an  Independent  Type  1 Extreme  Value 
distribution the usual MNL results (see Maddala, 1989), where the associated probabilities are: MNL  models  are extremely  popular in  practice due  to their  simplicity, flexibility and  ease of 
estimation. However, they do impose some very strong restrictions on the model, most notably the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This property states that the odds ratio eJ  /I$,  j  k , 
is independent of  all other alternatives in the choice set, and moreover independent of  additions to, 
and deletions from, the  full set of  alternatives. It appears infeasible that the probability of  self- 
C 
employment to PRP will be independent of the presence of fixed wage employment, for example. 
. 
This problem is exacerbated by  the fact that tests for IIA generally have very poor performance 
(see, for  example, Fry  and  Harris,  1996). Moreover,  importantly here,  we  need  to  allow  for 
ordering  in  the  dependent  variable.  That  is,  the  approach  advocated  in  this  paper  is  that 
employment contract types are necessarily ordered by the degree of  income risk. PRP contracts, 
comprising an element of both fixed and variable pay, offer a mid point between the two extremes 
of  fixed wage and self-employment.  We focus primarily on the risk of income and so presume that 
self-employment is relatively more risky  than PRP employment, which is itself relatively more 
risky  than  fixed  wage  employment. Our raw  data  supports this  hypothesis  with  the  standard 
deviation of  earnings around the mean being 200.72 for fixed wage employment, 371.43 for PRP 
employment and 828.75 for self-employment.ll 
An  obvious  approach  to  take  such  ordering  into  account  would  be  to  assume  that 
4 = B, Vj and also that the  E,  follow a standard normal distribution. Inclusion of the so-called 
cut-off  points yields the  Ordered Probit  model  (Maddala, 1989), with  the following associated 
probabilities: 
"  Our hypothesis that PRP  generates a relatively risky stream of income accords with the results of Seiler (1984) who 
finds that 'incentive'  workers in the US manufacturing sector experience higher yet more dispersed earnings than 'time 
rate'  workers. Similarly. Rees and Shah (1986) find that the variance of earnings for the self-employed is over three 
times that of paid employees. where a(.)  denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution and the 4's are cut-off points (or 
boundary parameters). Significance of these boundary parameters is often regarded as a test of  the 
presence of  ordering in the data. The data rarely rejects this hypothesis, even if  there does not 
appear to be  a strong case for ordering in  the data. Moreover, the Ordered Probit is relatively 
inflexible, as the coefficient vector P is restricted to be equivalent across alternatives. Indeed as 
Small (1987) states, 
'The ordered response model arises when the observed responses reflect intervals of a latent variable 
that is linear in unknown parameters, and it specifies an ogive function for the sum of the first (or 
last) k choice probabilities; it is sometimes called "ordered  logit" or "ordered  probit"  if  the ogive 
function is logistic or normal. The need to specify a single latent variable as a linear function causes 
ordered  response  models to  lack  the  flexibility  of  MNL  or  multivariate  probit'  (Small,  1987, 
p.410).'~ 
A more attractive alternative appears to be  Small's Ordered Generalised Extreme Value 
(OGEV) model (Small, 1987 and 1994). The OGEV model expands on the MNL one by allowing 
for ordering in the data and correlations of  alternatives in close vicinity. It nests the MNL model 
and moreover provides a simple test for such (and thus explicitly for ordering as well). This model 
is  particularly  well  suited  to  this  application, as  correlations  between  different  employment 
contracts appear very likely a priori. 
It  is possible to allow  the window  of  correlation  to be  arbitrarily large. However, this 
increases the number of  parameters to be estimated and  makes  estimation cumbersome (Small, 
a 
1987). Therefore we restrict attention to the standard OGEV model (Small, 1987, p.414). Moreover 
with  only  three  outcomes, this  additional complication does  not  appear to be  warranted.  The 
l2 In the context of our application the flexibility of our statistical model to allow the coefficients and significance 
levels to vary across alternatives is especially important given that we know that individual characteristics vary across 
contract types, for example the self-employed tend to be older than individuals in other types of employment. standard OGEV implies  a correlation between  neighbouring alternatives only. This  correlation 
declines the further away the two outcomes j and k are, and is zero when  1 j -  kl> 2.  Although the 
correlations cannot be explicitly written in  closed form, they are inversely related to p (defined 
below). The standard OGEV probabilities are given by: 
with  the  convention that  p-'~,  =pA1y,,+,  =O. For  obvious  reasons, there  is  a restriction that 
0 < p 51. As p +  1 OGEV probabilities converge to MNL ones, which give a simple parameter 
restriction  (p  =  1)  based test of  the  OGEV versus MNL formulations. This test is also one of 
ordering versus non-ordering of  the outcomes. As  p -+ 0, the associated cumulative distribution 
function  is a degenerate one, but one  still consistent with  random utility  maximization  (Small, 
1987). 
Defining an indicator as 
(1 if indvidual i chooses alternative i 
d, = 
10 otherwise 
the parameters of equation (6) can be estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function 
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As with the MNL model, for identification purposes, the pvector for one of  the alternatives (here 
PI) is normalised to zero, and the remaining choice coefficient vectors are interpreted relative to 
this omitted one. The  vector  of  explanatory  variables,  x,, contains  indvidual  attributes  and  household 
characteristics thought to influence an  individual's  type of  employment contract. The individual 
characteristics include gender, age, ethnic origin, family status and level of education. In addition, 
we control for job specific characteristics such as occupation and industry. We also control for the 
number of pre-school children in the household, the number of school age children, housing tenure 
and  geographical  region.  The  inclusion  of  the  risk  proxy  variables  in  the  model  is  less 
straightforward. Whilst they are a key focus of  this paper it is not possible to simply include the  . 
variables in Table 3 directly into the model. Given that they are jointly  acting as a proxy for the 
unobserved risk preference of  the individual, it is likely that they will be highly correlated with 
each other. We therefore adopt a principal component factor analysis approach (Spearman, 1904). 
Thus we find a small number  of  common factors (say q of  them) that  linearly construct the p 
original variables such that: 
where  yg is the value of the ith observation of the  jth variable (say alcohol expenditure), zik is the 
ith  observation  on the kth  common factor,  bkj is the set of  linear coefficients called the factor 
loadings, finally,  ey  is similar to the residual  in a regression  equation  but is known  as  the jth 
variable's  unique  factor.  That  is,  we  identify  underlying  factors  that  contain  most  of  the 
information in our 6 risk preference proxy variables. As is standard practice we retain only those 
factors that have eigenvalues > 0. These remaining factors can then  be  included  as orthogonal 
covariates in the regression analysis. Once the factors and their loadings have been estimated they 
1 
can be allocated an  interpretation. Interpretation  usually  implies examining the  bb's in order to 
name the factors - this may be a fairly subjective process. In our case the risk proxy variables can 
be summarised by two factors which following rotation intuitively reflect the original risk proxy 
variables, where rotation re-expresses the factors so that the loadings on a few initial variables are as  large  as  possible.  The  first  factor  'financial  security',  loads  most  heavily  on  contents 
insurance13, life  insurance and  unearned  income variables  and the  second factor  'risk'  in  the 
regression analysis below is most heavily loaded on our original smoking, drinlung and gambling 
expenditure variables. The fact that most of  our risk proxies  are measured in terms of levels of 
expenditure does give rise to one further issue. Different employment contracts could be associated 
with different levels of  income and thus changes in the level of expenditure may simply represent 
p  an  income effect rather than an  attitude towards risk.  The inclusion of  income as an explanatory 
variable or as  a scaling parameter for the levels of  expenditure is not possible here  as it is an 
endogenous variable. However observation of  the correlation between income and the risk proxies 
suggests that this problem does not arise. The correlation coefficients are small (the largest being 
0.23 for income and life insurance). 
V.  Results 
The results are set out  in  Tables 4 and 5 below. For comparison purposes, the Ordered Probit 
results are presented first followed by our preferred model, the OGEV. 
l3 This variable is a binary variable indicating if the individual has home contents insurance, whilst our other risk proxy 
variables are measured in levels of expenditure. For a principal component factor analysis this is not a problem as the 
aim is to find the factors that account for the key variations in the original variables. Table  4: Ordered Probir Analysis 
1 = Fixed Wage; 2 = PRP  Contract; 3=- Self-Employed 
Variable  Cue$  t - stat 
Demography 








Number Pre-School Children 
Number School Children 
Region 



















Year of Survey 
Survey - 1998199 
Survey - 1997198 
Occupation 




Risk preference factors 
Financial Security 
Risk 
Industry control variables 
Cut-off point 1 
Cut-off point 2  2.068  15.09 
Log Likelihood (Restricted)  - 10637 
Number of Observations  13675 Table 8: OGEV Analysis 
PRP Contract  Self-Employed 
Variable  Coefficient  t - stat  Coefficient  t - stat 
Demography 
Black  -0.194  1.108  -0.119  0.389 
Asian  -0.350  2.263  0.559  2.989 
Other Ethnic  -0.1  17  0.626  0.134  0.473 
Age/lO  0.787  4.958  1.5  17  6.059 
Age-Squaredl 100  -0.100  4.894  -0.135  4.739 
Males  0.023  0.517  0.424  4.877 
SeparatediWidowedIDivorced  0.099  1.840  0.362  3.202 
Single  0.132  1.578  0.328  2.192 
Number Pre-School Children  0.045  1.180  0.21  1  3.327 
Number School Children  -0.088  3.107  0.165  4.491 
Region 
Yorkshire And Humberside  -0.233  1.974  -0.002  0.009 
North West  0.130  1.611  0.021  0.158 
East Midlands  -0.206  1.730  -0.160  0.842 
West Midlands  -0.102  1.280  0.013  0.099 
East Anglia  0.178  2.020  -0.084  0.547 
Greater London  0.08 1  1.172  -0.183  1.448 
South East  -0.045  0.486  -0.201  1.178 
South West  -0.002  0.023  0.200  1.491 
Wales  -0.123  1.287  0.034  0.228 
Scotland  -0.047  0.406  0.085  0.463 
Northern Ireland  0.107  1  .OOO  0.154  0.887 
Education 
GCSE  0.079  1.402  0.081  0.968 
Further Education  0.151  2.300  0.098  0.978 
Higher Education  0.185  2.662  0.173  1.605 
Housing Tenure 
Private Rent  -0.032  0.360  0.950  5.77 1 
Mortgage  0.204  3.058  0.559  4.564 
Owned Outright  0.128  1.561  0.838  5.654 
Year Of Survey 
Survey - 1998199  -0.193  4.229  -0.483  6.416 
Survey - 1997198  -0.134  3.002  -0.341  4.684 
Occupation 
Managerial And Technical  -0.015  0.217  -0.416  3.644 
Skilled  -0.341  4.017  -0.078  0.658 
Semi-skilled  -0.248  2.698  -0.202  1.387 
Unskilled  -0.444  2.912  -0.196  0.955 
Risk preference factors 
Financial Security  -0.084  3.770  -0.132  4.806 
Risk  0.033  1.918  0.042  1.668 
Industry control variables  Yes  Yes 
Constant  - 1.767  5.189  -7.644  9.62 1 
P  0.609  tstat  4.218 
Log Likelihood (Restricted)  -9870 
Number of Observations  13675 Prior to discussing the estimated coefficients on the explanatory variables we will present 
a comparison of  our two models. A useful tool in helping to differentiate between the estimation 
techniques is to ascertain the model's within-sample prediction accuracy. A common measure of 
predictive accuracy in discrete choice models is the "hit-miss"  table. The predictions  underlying 
hit-miss  tables  are  given  by  assigning individuals the  outcome  associated  with  their  highest 
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predicted probability across the alternatives and then comparing this to the observed outcome. The 
hit-miss tables for the two models have been calculated (and for comparison purposes the case of  a 
random assignment of individuals into employment contract types according to sample proportions) 
and presented in Table 9, which gives a summary of  actual versus predicted values. 
Table 9: Hit and Miss Tables 
Ordered Probit 
I  I  I  I 
OGEV 
Total  I  12032  1  1302  1  341  )  13675 
Random Assignment 
It is clear that in terms of predictive power the OGEV model is superior, predicting 66.5%  ', 
of observations correctly; compared to 63.3% for the Ordered Probit specification and 49% in the 
case of  a  random  assignment  of  individuals into employment contract types.  Figure  1 further 
illustrates the predictive power of  the OGEV model by graphing the actual sample proportions by 
contract type against those predicted at the sample means by the OGEV model. Whilst the OGEV model clearly performs well, it does slightly over predict the number of  fixed wage employees and 
slightly under predict the number of PRP and self-employed workers. 
Figure I: Sample proportions and predictions at sample 
means 
Fixed wage  Profit Related Pay  Self-employed 
Contract type 
The significance of the cut-off points in the Ordered Probit analysis is often regarded as a 
test of the significance of ordering in the dependent variable. In our case the significance of the cut- 
off  points in  the Ordered Probit model suggests the presence of  ordering, however, whilst  this 
model can accommodate the ordering it still has the drawback that it does not allow the coefficients 
and significance levels to vary across alternatives. This flexibility is especially important in this 
investigation given that we know from previous literature that individual characteristics do vary 
across contract types, for example the self-employed tend to be older than individuals employed 
under other types of contract. In the OGEV specification we can test for the presence of  ordering in  . 
the following way, as  p +  -  OGEV probabilities converge to MNL ones, which gives a simple 
s 
parameter restriction ( p = 1)  based test of the OGEV versus MNL, specifications. This is implicitly 
a test of ordering versus non-ordering of the outcomes in the choice set. It should also be noted that 
as p -+  0 the associated cumulative distribution function is degenerate, but is still consistent with 
random utility maximisation.  Here the  statistical significance of  p  in the OGEV specification (p=0.609,  t-stat=  -4.218)  shows  that  accounting for  the  ordering  of  employment  contracts 
according to their degree of  income risk is important in modelling types of  employment contract. 
That is, p is statistically significantly different from 0  or 1 (at the 95% level) and therefore the one 
tailed test of  p > 1 against p = 1 accepts the null hypothesis. Thus ignoring the ordering in our data 
by  applying a standard MNL model  would  result  in misspecification and erroneous  inferences. 
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Whilst  applying an  Ordered Probit  model  does  account  for  the  ordering,  we  know  it  is  too 
restrictive given  that  it  does not  allow  the  coefficients  and  significance levels  to  vary  across 
% 
alternatives. Thus the OGEV model is our preferred specification. 
Before  considering the  key  results  of  this  paper  regarding  the  relationship  between 
employment contract type and risk preference we will briefly discuss the relationship between  a 
number of  individual characteristics and employment contract type. Given the greater performance 
of  the OGEV  model  relative to  the Ordered Probit we  will  concentrate our discussion of the 
coefficients on  the explanatory variables to  those  estimated from the OGEV model. Moreover, 
discussion of  the OGEV estimates are more informative given that they are not restricted to be the 
same across all contract types. We begin by  discussing the influence of  personal characteristics and 
then proceed to consider household specific characteristics. Due to the complexity of  the implicit 
marginal  effects of  the OGEV model,  which  in non-linear models  are data dependant and  for 
reasons of  clarity  we  present  implied probabilities for  different  realisation  of  our  explanatory 
variables. It is apparent from Table  8 that Asian  respondents are significantly less likely to be 
employed on a PRP contract and more likely to be self-employed, than on a fixed wage contract  . 
ceteris paribus. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 2, which graphs the predicted probabilities of 
being in each contract type for each ethnic group where all other explanatory variables have been 
set at their sample means. The higher incidence of  Asians in self-employment is clearly visible. Figure 2; Predicted probabilites- Ethnicity 
white  black  asian  other 
D  Fixed Wage 
Ethnicihl  &I  Profit Related Pay 
el self-Employed 
It is also evident from the OGEV results that age significantly impacts on the probability of 
being in each type of employment contract. The predicted probabilities are graphed in Figure 3. The 
age profile of  fixed wage employees is u-shaped, whereas the age profile of  PRP workers is n- 
shaped. The probability of being in self-employment increases with age in accordance with those of 
Rees and Shah (1986). The magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the age variable suggest that 
the self-employed are, on average, older than PRP employees, who are in turn older than fixed 
wage employees. 
Figure 3:  Predicted Probabilty- Age 
age 20  age 30  age 40  age 50  age 60 
Age  U  Fixed Wage 
Profit Related Pay 
Self-Employed 
With respect to gender, the results suggest that, compared to workers employed on fixed 
wage contracts and on PRP, self-employed workers are less likely to be female. PRP workers have fewer children of school age whereas self-employed workers are more likely to have both more pre- 
school and school-age children, relative to fixed wage workers. 
There is  some evidence that higher  levels of  human capital as proxied by education are 
associated with PRP. In contrast to other authors (for example, Rees and Shah, 1986, Borjas, 1986, 
Borjas and Bronars,  1989 and Evans and highton, 1989), we  find no evidence that educational 
attainment  is  positively  correlated  with  the  probability  of  self-employment.  The  predicted 
probabilities by educational attainment for the different types of employment contract are shown in  I 
Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Predicted Probabilties- Education 
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Education  Fixed wage 
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Regarding housing tenure, it would  appear that, relative to fixed wage employees, PRP 
workers are relatively more likely to be living in mortgaged homes ceteris paribus. In terms of 
occupational status, it is apparent that, relative to fixed wage employees, PRP employees and the 
self-employed are more likely to be in the professional occupational category. 
Finally, turning to our risk preference proxies we  observe that, compared to fixed wage 
employees, PRP workers and the self-employed spend relatively less on financial security ceteris 
paribus, That is, the degree of  investment in financial security is inversely related to the degree of 
income risk associated with an individual's employment contract. With respect to consumption risk 
we  can  see that there is a positive relationship with the degree of income risk (significant at  the 10% level). These results suggest the existence of  some form of  systematic relationship between 
risk preferences (proxied by our two factors) and employment within a particular type of  contract. 
These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  there  is  a positive association between 
income risk and an individual's  level of  risk preference. The higher the individuals' preference for 
risk  (in terms  of  lower levels of  financial  security  and  higher levels of  consumption of  risky 
products) the greater the probability that the individual will hold a contract type characterised by 
c  high levels of  income risk. These findings are consistent with the studies cited earlier regarding risk 
preference and  self-employment but  are derived from a much  richer  data set that  accounts for 
income risk ordered across three types of employment contract; fixed wage workers, PRP and self- 
employment. 
IV.  Final Comments 
In this paper we have investigated the implied degree of  'risk'  associated with self-employment, 
PRP and fixed wage employment. Our focus is the implied degree of  income risk associated with 
each type of  employment contract. We therefore regard fixed wage employment as the most stable 
and,  conversely,  self-employment  as the  most  risky  (previous  caveats noted). We regard  PRP 
contracts, comprising an element of  both fixed and variable pay, as being a middle road between 
the two extremes. 
We have investigated the relationship between employment within a particular contract type 
and risk preference,  as  proxied  through  principal  component factor analysis whereby a host  of 
expenditures on  risky goods and goods  associated with  risk  aversion have been reduced to two 
r 
factors. The first factor representing  'financial security'  and the second factor representing 'risk'. 
Our results allude to a systematic relationship between our risk preference proxies and employment 
within  a particular type of  contract. Indeed, risk  preferring behaviour  is found to be  positively 
correlated with  income  risk.  Moreover,  we  have  shown  the  presence  of  an  ordering  across 
employment contracts consistent with the level of  income risk associated with contract types. Our findings contribute  to the  current debate focusing on  the relationship  between  risk 
loving behaviour and entrepreneurial success - see, for example, Van Praag and Crarner (2001). 
Van Praag and Cramer (2001) find that risk aversion is a serious impediment to entrepreneurship in 
that a successful entrepreneur should be willing to bear risk. In the context of their paper, the size 
of the work force employed is taken as a measure of  entrepreneurial success. Our findings suggest 
X 
that  a  link  between  risk  preferring  behaviour  and  type  of  employment contract  exists.  To be 
specific, our findings indicate that the self-employed are likely to exhibit risk  loving behaviour  , 
which, according to the findings of Van Praag and Crarner (2001), suggests that these individuals 
are more likely to be successful entrepreneurs relative to individuals with different risk preferences. 
Furthermore  our results  suggest  that  risk  averse individuals are more  likely  to be  fixed  wage 
employees rather than unsuccessful entrepreneurs. The existence of  PRP provides an alternative for 
those individuals with some taste for risk, but who are not sufficiently risk loving to enter self- 
employment.  From  society's  point  of  view, such findngs may  reflect an  optimal  matching of 
employment contract type and risk preference in  that self-employment is often regarded  as the 
sector of  the economy that stimulates the demand for labour and promotes job  creation thereby 
helping to alleviate unemployment and poverty. References 
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